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ABSTRACT
Transfer learning is prevalent as a technique to efficiently gener-
ate new models (Student models) based on the knowledge trans-
ferred from a pre-trained model (Teacher model). However, Teacher
models are often publicly available for sharing and reuse, which
inevitably introduces vulnerability to trigger severe attacks against
transfer learning systems. In this paper, we take a first step towards
mitigating one of the most advanced misclassification attacks in
transfer learning. We design a distilled differentiator via activation-
based network pruning to enervate the attack transferability while
retaining accuracy.We adopt an ensemble structure from variant dif-
ferentiators to improve the defence robustness. To avoid the bloated
ensemble size during inference, we propose two-phase defence, in
which inference from the Student model is firstly performed to nar-
row down the candidate differentiators to be assembled, and later
only a small, fixed number of them can be chosen to validate clean
or reject adversarial inputs effectively. Our comprehensive eval-
uations on both large and small image recognition tasks confirm
that the Student models with our defence of only 5 differentia-
tors immune over 90% the adversarial inputs with accuracy loss
less than 10%. Our comparison also demonstrates that our design
outperforms prior problematic defences.
1 INTRODUCTION
Transfer learning is widely applied in the development of machine
learning systems and has been integrated into commercialized ma-
chine learning services, e.g., Google Cloud AI [10]. It facilitates ef-
fortless derivation of new models (Student models) through tuning
a pre-trained (Teacher model) on a relevant task with less training
data and computation cost [21]. For example, the InceptionV3 classi-
fier training on ImageNet [6] with 1.2 million images requires more
than 2 weeks using 8 GPUs [30]. By contrast, in transfer learning, a
quality face recolonization Student model can be developed from a
Teacher model with only several hundred training images in several
minutes [21, 33].
While expediting the training and curtailing the demands of
the data for Student models, transfer learning encounters severe
threats [13, 33, 36], as conventional machine learning systems. Well-
trained Teacher models become attractive targets, as they are com-
monly hosted on public platforms and are extensively utilized. Re-
cent attacks targeting transfer learning [33] generate adversarial
examples to induce misclassification competently. Based on the
boundary conditions revealed from the Teacher models, attack-
ers can imitate and manipulate the input’s internal features in the
associated Student models, even when these Student models are
not accessible to the attackers. Such attacks are powerful, since
the transferability of the adversarial manipulation preserves, i.e.,
no matter whether the structures and parameters of the Student
models are modified or not.
To our best knowledge, most of the existing defences against
adversarial examples are not suitable in transfer learning. For in-
stances, adversarial detection [7] loses its ability since the new
model structures and weights are modified, and adversarial train-
ing [16, 31] based approaches are not optimized for the targeted
Student models in transfer learning. Wang et al. proposed two basic
defences for transfer learning, i.e., Randomizing Input via Dropout
and Injecting Neuron Distances [33], which are either of limited
model accuracy or high training difficulty. More importantly, they
both fall short of improving the overall robustness of the model,
i.e., less effective to non-targeted attacks. Detailed comparisons can
be found in our experiments in Section 4.
To address these drawbacks, we aim to make a first step to-
wards effectively mitigating the advanced misclassification attacks
against transfer learning [33]. Our goal is to scalably strengthen the
trained customized models (Student models) to detect and reject
the adversarial inputs while retaining the model accuracy.
Challenges andTechnical Insights:There are several challenges
yet to be resolved to achieve the above goal. The first is how to re-
duce the transferability of the attacks. The targeted Student models
are highly vulnerable, since the misclassification attacks feature
strong transferability among the Student models that are simply
developed from a public Teacher model. To break such transfer-
ability, we design dedicated classifiers, called differentiators, in a
non-trivial manner. In particular, we carefully apply network prun-
ing to make them highly distilled and vary widely from the Teacher
model. To expand these dissimilarities, we adapt pruning based
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on the activation from only two classes, which causes the utmost-
possible dissimilarity between the differentiator and the Teacher
model.
Each of the differentiators can only mitigate the attacks between
two specific classes, and thus employing a single differentiator is not
robust to the variance of attacks among other classes. To overcome
this limitation, one can use the ensemble method and group the
differentiators with every class pair to cover all possible attacks
against arbitrary classes. Despite being highly effective, we realize
that these differentiators developed by only two classes increase
the size of the ensemble models for complex classification tasks. A
practical challenge here is how to reduce long inference latency
caused by the bloated ensemble models.
To improve scalability, our observation is that given a certain ad-
versarial example, not all the differentiators are related to the source
or target class of it. Accordingly, we pare our design by selecting
differentiators classifying between the preliminary inference class
from the Student model and other classes. The preliminary infer-
ence is either the correct source class from a clean example, or the
target one from an adversarial example. Therefore, the differentia-
tors corresponding to the preliminary inference class are able to
validate the clean inputs or reject the attacker’s inputs. Because a
significant portion of our differentiators can successfully reject the
adversarial examples, randomly selecting a few of the correspond-
ing ones for ensemble is sufficient for defence in inference.
Contributions: The main contributions of our work are summa-
rized as follows:
• To our best knowledge, we are the first to propose effective
yet comprehensive defences for transfer learning. Our design
mitigates both the targeted and non-targeted misclassifica-
tion attacks [33]. The former attacks generate adversarial
inputs which can be identified to a target class, while the
latter ones can misclassify the inputs to any other classes.
• We carefully utilize network pruning to build differentiators,
where each differentiator is designed to infer two specific
classes dedicatedly and to be immune to adversarial inputs.
To deduct the transferability of the attacks, we apply acti-
vation pruning when developing the distilled models. To
preserve the accuracy, we choose flexible pruning ratios
for different layers to reduce the accuracy loss caused by
pruning, and iteratively retrain the pruned models. For effi-
ciency, we further adopt independent pruning for each layer
to curtail the time cost of the design implementation.
• We incorporate an ensemble structure into our defence to
improve the robustness of the overall models against the
attacks among all classes. We instantiate our ensemble struc-
ture using a general developing Student model and a group
of our two-class differentiators. In the first phase, the pre-
liminary inference result is utilized from the Student model
to narrow down the possible source or target classes of the
inputs. In the second phase, only a small, fixed number of the
differentiators that correspond to these classes validate clean
or reject adversarial inputs. As a result, our design satisfies
the defence rate, model accuracy, and scalability.
• We implement our defence for two transfer learning appli-
cations, i.e., Face Recognition (83 classes) and Traffic Sign
Recognition (43 classes). We evaluate our design on the de-
fence rate, model accuracy, efficiency of the model develop-
ment and inference, and even effectiveness against general
attacks like FGSM [9] and DeepFool [20]. The results for
both tasks confirm that our ensemble models can reject over
91% of the adversarial examples only with 5 differentiators
in 2 seconds. It achieves more than 90% defence rates with
different attack configurations on attack layers and perturba-
tion budgets. Meanwhile, our design preserves the accuracy
above 90% after decent pruning and retraining. Last but not
least, we conduct comprehensive comparisons with prior
arts to demonstrate that our defence achieves higher defence
rates, particularly for the non-targeted attacks. Our defence
rates are ∼90% for both tasks, while prior arts proposed
in [33] only reach ∼20% for Face and ∼40% for Traffic Sign
Recognition.
Organization: The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides the background knowledge of misclassification
attacks in transfer learning and network pruning used in our de-
sign. Section 3 presents our defence design in details. Section 4
shows the experimental results of our defence and the comparisons
among our design to others. Section 5 discusses effectiveness of
our design in broader scenarios. Section 6 introduces related work
on attacks and defences of machine learning and transfer learning
systems. Section 7 gives a conclusion and future directions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Misclassification Attacks against Transfer
Learning
Transfer Learning: Transfer learning is proposed to learn knowl-
edge from a completed model and prediction task, and improve the
training of new models for different tasks. The knowledge can be
either domain information, which consists of the feature space and
the marginal probability distribution of the training data, or the
learning task, which consists of a label space of the training data
and the pre-trained model fitting the objective predictive function
of this task [21]. Based on existing knowledge, transfer learning
speeds up the development of the new models even when their
domains or learning tasks are different.
A simple way of transfer learning is developing a new model
based on both weights and architectures of the layers from a well-
trained model. If the new model has a similar domain or learning
task as the pre-trained model, it can be directly built by fine-tuning
the parameters to fit its task. For a transfer learning process, the
Student model first copies both the architecture and weights from
the Teacher model. After that, the last classification layer of the
Student model is tailored to fit the new classification task. Then,
the Student model is tuned based on the similarity of two tasks.
One common methodology of tuning is to freeze several layers and
retrain the rest of them as shown in Figure 1.
As we mentioned before, reusing the Teacher model introduces
the vulnerability of the Student models. Recent studies have ex-
ploited it and propose adversarial attacks specifically targeting
transfer learning systems. To our best knowledge, the most effec-
tive and easily deployable ones are the misclassification attacks
introduced by Wang et al. [33].
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Figure 1: Transfer Learning
Attacks Assumption: To be consistent, we follow the same as-
sumption as Wang et al. [33]. The attacks assume white-box access
to Teacher models and black-box to Student models.
White-box Teacher Model: We first assume that the attackers have
full access to the Teacher model. This is realistic because most of
the well-trained models are publicly available. The attackers can
pretend to be one of the students so that they can know both the
weights and the architecture of the Teacher models. We also assume
that the attackers can find the corresponding Teacher model when
they are targeting at a Student model. [33] introduces this Teacher
model fingerprinting method.
Black-box Student Model: The attackers are assumed to have no
access to the Student models. Namely, the Student models are con-
sidered as black boxes. We assume that neither the model parame-
ters (including the weights and the architecture) nor the training
datasets for Student models are accessible to the attackers. In real
situations, this information may include sensitive and private data
that is normally considered proprietary to Student model owners.
Besides, we assume that the attackers can only use limited queries
to the implemented Student models, which makes them hard to
reproduce the shadow models.
To make coherent assumptions as [33], we do not consider the
case where the Student models are reproduced or leaked. If the
attackers can directly gain enough information from the Student
models rather than from the Teacher models, the implementation
of the attacks will not be impacted by the transfer learning method.
Namely, this case will become a generic attack and defence problem
in machine learning. Nevertheless, our design further considers a
stronger attacker according to a guiding principle introduced in [4],
which suggests that the adversaries might obtain some knowledge
of the defence algorithm. More details can be found in Section 5.
Misclassification Attacks Methodology: Figure 2 depicts the
idea of how the misclassification attacks [33] conduct in transfer
learning. The key insight is that the attacks can make the internal
features of a certain layer output in Teacher models for two different
input images being very similar.
We refer to this certain layer as attack layer. Given a transfer
learning system, the attackers expect a carefully chosen layer where
the layers before it may be frozen or just be slightly tuned during
the development of the Student models. In this case, the internal
features of the attack layer outputs can still be similar in the Student
models. Since the models are feedforward networks, each layer’s
output will only depend on the preceding output. Once two internal
features of the output from the attack layer are close enough, the
Source Image
with class A
Attack Layer
Target Image 
with class B
Perturbation
Similar Internal Feature
Layer the same as Teacher Model
… …
… …
+
Class B
Class B
Figure 2: Misclassification Attacks in Transfer Learn-
ing [33]
NeuronSignificant connectivity
Non-significant connectivity
Original Model Structure Pruned Model Structure
Non-significant Filter
Figure 3: Network Pruning
outputs for the rest are also likely to be very similar even they are
retrained. Such similarity will be maintained to the final prediction.
As a result, the misclassification takes place since two inputs with
different labels have a similar prediction. For realisation, it can be
translated into an optimized problem which minimizes the distance
for the internal outputs by limited perturbations. More details can
be found in Appendix A.
2.2 Network Pruning
Network pruning aims to remove the unimportant connectivities of
a network which makes a dense neural network become a sparser
one. By carefully choosing the pruned connectivities and further
tuning the networks, the accuracy loss of the pruned networks
can be acceptable. According to prior work [11, 32], most of the
model structures have redundant neurons and connectives. These
connectives are less active during the classification tasks. Pruning
these unnecessary components can improve the efficiency of both
inferring and storing for the machine learning models. Figure 3
overviews the pruning over a three-layer neural network.
In particularly, there are two approaches for pruning. (1)Weight-
based pruning. It is a simple and direct way. A threshold weight
value can be chosen and all connectives with fewer weight val-
ues than the threshold can be removed [11]. (2) Activation-based
pruning. It considers how the weights are activated by the ex-
pected inputs [24]. It removes the connectives with fewer activation
compared to the threshold. Besides, for large neural networks with
convolution layers, the convolution matrix (also called kernel or
filter) rather than each connectives can be pruned. It is shown that
removing entire filters can produce a network with a more regular
structure compared to remove [11, 24].
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After pruning, the further process should be applied to reduce
the loss of accuracy. A simple way is retraining the pruned network.
In prior work [11, 24], in order to achieve a high pruning rate with
less accuracy loss, the network is pruned and retrained iteratively
by gradually increasing the pruning rates.
3 DEFENCE DESIGN
3.1 Defence Goal and Evaluation
Goal: Our goal is to develop a defence approach to address the
attacks described above. Considering the real application scenarios
for the defenders, several assumptions are made. Since robust ma-
chine learning systems against the adversarial inputs are desired
for users, our defense’s development can be fully supported by the
customers owning the Student models. Naturally, the defenders are
assumed to have access to both weights and structures of the Stu-
dent models as well as their training data. They are also assumed to
be able to modify the Student models and make them more robust
to the adversarial images.
Evaluation: In particular, the defence will be evaluated in terms
of both efficiency and effectiveness as follows:
Classification Accuracy: The models with our defence should be
able to classify the clean images successfully. These models should
restrain the decrease of accuracy on clean inputs within 10% com-
pared to the original models.
Defence Success Rate: Our defence is expected to detect most of the
adversarial inputs for both the targeted and non-targeted and reject
them.
Time Consuming: As one of the motivations of transfer learning is to
save cost for large scale learning tasks, our defence should introduce
a comparable inference time cost to the ordinary inference or prior
other defences.
Model Size: Our defence is also expected to consume acceptable
storage resources. Our defence should be scalable for large models,
because transfer learning will be widely adopted when the Teacher
models become large and complex.
3.2 Defence Intuition
We first present the design intuition of our defence against the mis-
classification attacks. As introduced in Section 2, the effectiveness
of the misclassification attacks relies on manufacturing a similar
internal representation at an attack layer. To address these attacks, a
direct and effective solution is modifying the models to make them
different from the original ones. Among others, network pruning
has been shown effective in modifying the model structure and
restrain the transferability of the attacks [18, 33]. As introduced
in Section 2, pruning removes lots of connectivities of the models,
which makes them far from the original dense ones. The difference
between the pruned models and targeted models can reduce the
effectiveness of the attacks. Besides, the sparse networks are also
more efficient for development (fine-tuning) and application (in-
ference of the models) later, which conforms to the advantages of
using transfer learning.
To further reduce the attack success rate while extending the
defence to non-targeted attacks, we adapt ensemble models, which
are widely used in a machine learning system.The intuition is that,
with limited perturbation, it is hard for the adversarial inputs to
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Input
(Class 𝒊 targeting 
at Class 𝒋)
Reject
Ensemble of Differentiators
Clean Input
(Class 𝒊)
Prediction:
Class 𝒊
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𝒊
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Figure 4: Inference Strategy
maintain the transferability to the variance of models. The adver-
sarial images can only fool parts of these models and loss their
transferability to the rest of them. The overall ensemble models
with difference classifiers achieve stronger robustness against these
attacks.
While extending the defence to non-targeted attacks, a naive
approach that combines differentiators for all possible attack pairs
results in a large ensemble model, which contains (K − 1)K/2 dif-
ferentiators for a K label classification problem). To improve the
scalability of our design and reduce the inference latency caused
by the large size of the ensemble models, we design a two-phase in-
ference. The inputs are first predicted by the Student model trained
by general transfer learning without pruning. The inference result
should be either the correct source class from a clean example or the
target one from an adversarial example. Therefore, differentiators
classifying between the source or target class and other classes are
chosen to validate or reject the inputs. The distinctiveness among
these differentiators and the Student model is sufficient to reduce
the attack effectiveness due to the activation pruning based on only
the activation of their corresponding classes. As a result, a small
group of randomly selected differentiators can still be different,
making it hard for the adversarial inputs to fool all of them. The
ensemble models consisted of them can be robust to the adversarial
examples.
3.3 Defence Implementation
This section introduces the details of our proposed defence im-
plementation. Specifically, we will describe how to construct the
ensemble models and then develop the differentiators.
3.3.1 Ensemble Construction. The inference consists of two steps:
a preliminary inference by the original Student model and a vali-
dation inference by a group of differentiators. For a classification
problem with K classes, the inputs are first predicted by the gen-
eral Student model. For any inference results as class ci , there are
K − 1 possible label pairs (ci , c j ), where each of them corresponds
to a differentiator trained by their corresponding subsets.They are
expected to be fully pruned and robust to the adversarial inputs
according to the design goals of the differentiators.
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Algorithm 1 Inference Strategy
Input:
x , input image;
So , general Student model;
S1,2, S1,3, ... SK−1,K , differentiators classifying between
every two classes in a K classes classification problem,
their outputs are labels from 1 to K;
k , size of the ensemble models, where k < K .
Output:
y, final prediction.
1: function inference(x , So , S1,2, S1,3, . . . SK−1,K )
2: // Phase 1: preliminary inference
3: pre_result ← So (x)
4: // Phase 2: validate clean or reject adversarial inputs
5: Obtain {Si, j }, where pre_result is i or j
6: Randomly select {S}k from {Si, j }
7: for each S ∈ {S}k do
8: valid_result ← S(x)
9: if valid_result , pre_result then
10: // reject adversarial input defined as class 0
11: return 0
12: // clean input passes the validation
13: y ← pre_result
14: return y
Figure 4 illustrates an example of the above progress. For any
clean inputs, the Student model is likely to provide a correct pre-
liminary prediction. All the differentiators then can validate this
result as they are trained by a subset training data consisted of the
correct label dataset. For an adversarial input, the Student model
might be easily fooled and provide a wrong prediction. However, it
is difficult for the adversarial input to fool all differentiators. If one
of the differentiators comes to a different prediction, the input is
considered as an adversarial example and rejected.
To reduce the latency of our design, our observation is that a
small numbers of randomly selected corresponding differentiators
are sufficient to reject almost all the adversarial images. Besides,
inferring among more differentiators may reduce the accuracy of
the whole ensemble models due to False Negative. As a result, our
implementation aims to minimize the number of differentiators in
regard to the defence specification of the applications. The detailed
strategy is described in Algorithm 1. Later in our experiments, 5
differentiators achieve balance on defence rate and accuracy for
both small and large tasks.
3.3.2 Distilled Differentiator. In our design, network pruning is ap-
plied to develop the distilled differentiators. To reduce the accuracy
loss of pruning, they are pruned based on the activation of their
whole training data, which is shown in Algorithm 2.
As we introduced above, each differentiator is trained to classify
between two classes by its corresponding dataset. To save the train-
ing cost, our design applies the general transfer learning method
to build the differentiators. As introduced in Section 2, some of the
layers copied from the Teacher model are frozen, and the rest of
them will be retrained by the dataset for the differentiator’s tasks.
Algorithm 2 Differentiator Generator
Input:
Di ,D j , two training datasets for the differentiator;
Steacher , the Teacher model of the transfer learning task.
act , the activation of the two class for Teacher model.
Output:
Sd , a distilled differentiator.
1: function DifferentiatorTraining(Di ,D j , Steacher )
2: for each layer in Steacher do
3: if layer is convolution layer then
4: Filter Pruning in layer based on act
5: if layer is full-connected layer then
6: Connective Pruning in layer based on act
7: Sstudent ← Trans f erLearninд(Di ,D j , Steacher )
8: for i = 1 to IterationTimes do
9: for eachUnf rozenLayer in Sstudent do
10: Pruning inUnf rozenLayer based on act
11: Sd ← FineTuninд(Sstudent )
12: return Sd
After that, these differentiators are distilled via pruning each layer.
The details are presented as follows.
Activation Pruning:We use activation pruning which has been
demonstrated comprehensive by considering the effect of both in-
puts and models parameters. In our design, the differentiators are
expected to be highly distilled and variant to each other. The activa-
tion pruning based on different training data increases the disparity
among these differentiators, which can improve the robustness of
ensemble models. Meanwhile, activation pruning is also shown to
have less accuracy loss comparing the weight pruning. Therefore,
the distilled models via activation pruning are more adaptive to
the Student model tasks. Note that our differentiators only focus
on the corresponding two classes. Therefore, they can still achieve
high accuracy, even pruned and tuned by a small dataset, which is
desired in transfer learning scenarios.
Pruning via Ratio: Our design prunes the models via ratio rather
than threshold values. Based on our observation, the values of the
activation can be entirely different for each differentiator while the
pruning ratios can be limited in a small range, which expedites our
defence development.
Different Ratio for Different Layers: In our defence, different
pruning rates are chosen for different layers in each differentiator.
According to previous work [17], each layer has a different sensitiv-
ity corresponding to the final model accuracy. Therefore, pruning
ratios for different layers in our design correspond to their pruning
sensitivity [11]. They are chosen following general pruning strate-
gies [11, 24] to maintain the overall accuracy while pruning the
redundant components as much as possible. Since each differen-
tiator is pruned based on activation, using similar pruning ratios
still results in contrasting models. Based on our experiments, more
than half of the differentiators can share the same pruning ratios
while achieving a high defence rate. As a result, the efforts of tuning
pruning rates are somehow limited.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Bang Wu, Shuo Wang, Xingliang Yuan, Cong Wang, Carsten Rudolph, and Xiangwen Yang
Filters and Connectives: To distil the differentiators better, we
apply diverse strategies for different types of layers. For the full-
connected layers, we prune every single connectivity evaluating
their activation. For the convolution layers, we prune the filters con-
sisting of correlative connectives. While the work [17] shows that
pruning the filters in the convolution layers makes the networks
more efficient, we find it also improves the defence.
Independent Pruning: We prune each layer separately, where
the pruning for each layer is not affected by the others. By pruning
each layer independently, every layer can be pruned in parallel
which makes our pruning more efficient. The activation of each
class for activation pruning are calculated once and reused when
developing other differentiators.
Iteration Pruning and Retraining: To preserve accuracy, we
propose to retrain and prune the last several layers of the models
iteratively. As directly pruning the networks will harm the accuracy
of the models, the classifiers can regain accuracy by performing
iteration pruning and retraining the whole models [11]. To limit
the computation cost, only the iterative method is only applied to
the unfrozen layers.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we report the experimental results of our defence.We
demonstrate that our design highly improves the robustness of the
models against the misclassification attacks in transfer learning. We
also show that our defence is scalable for various classification tasks
and adversarial examples with different configurations. Specifically,
we evaluate our defence in accuracy and defence success rates, and
compare it with prior arts over two typical tasks. We also evaluate
a popular attack in conventional machine learning systems, i.e.
FGSM [9] to show that our design is applicable to general attacks
of adversarial samples.
4.1 Experimental Setup
This section introduces the setups of our experiments. Specifically,
wewill propose the application tasks, the transfer learning scenarios
and then the attack setup.
4.1.1 Teacher and Student Models Selection. To evaluate our de-
fence, we apply the misclassification attacks to two popular transfer
learning tasks: (1) Face Recognition (recognizing 83 public persons
in a dataset called PubFig [23]), and (2) Traffic Sign Recognition
(recognizing 43 traffic signs in a dataset called GTSRB [27]).
Face Recognition: The task is to classify human faces. It is a common
task used to evaluate both attacks and defences. The Teacher model
is a popular and public pre-trained model, called VGG-Face [22]
which is well trained by 2.6M faces with an accuracy of over 90%.
The Student model will be trained to classify 83 persons chosen
from PubFig dataset [15] with only 7470 images.
Traffic Sign Recognition: This task is to classify different traffic signs
for an auto-driving system. The Teacher model is a normal VGG16
model [26] trained via the ImageNet dataset with 14 million images.
The top-5 test accuracy of this pre-trained model is about 90.1%.
The training data for our Student model comes from the GTSRB
dataset [28] which includes 39209 images of 43 traffic signs.
As mentioned in Section 2, transfer learning is commonly used
with benefits when developing a Student model with relatively
small-scale training data. To simulate this scenario, both Teacher
models used in our experiments are popular pre-trained models
derived from a large amount of data, while both Student models
are using the much smaller-scale training datasets comparing the
Teacher models.
4.1.2 Transfer Method Selection. In particular, there are three ap-
proaches for realization of transfer learning based on the extent of
the tuning [33]. One is called Deep-layer Feature Extractor, where
only the last layer is changed and trained by the Student model
training datasets. The second one is Mid-layer Feature Extractor
that unfreezes and retrains some of the layers. The third one named
Full Model Fine-tuning unfreezes and tunes all of the layers.
According to previous work [33], the misclassification attacks
are less effective for the Student models developed using Full Model
Fine-tuning. Therefore, only the applications for the former two
approaches are evaluated in our experiments. For the first task,
both the Teacher model and the Student model focus on face recog-
nition. Therefore, the transfer learning system can be applied in
a direct and simple way. Based on the observation in [33], a Face
Recognition model developed as a Deep-layer Feature Extractor
achieves higher accuracy than other transfer processes. As a result,
the Deep-layer Feature Extractor is built for the Face Recognition in
our experiments. For the second task, the Teacher model is classify-
ing general objects, while the Student model focuses on traffic signs.
Therefore, we again follow the same configuration as [33] and use
Mid-layer Feature Extractor in this task. The cut-off layer is chosen
to be layer 10 out of 16 for the VGG16 Model when developing the
Student model to achieve high accuracy.
4.1.3 Attack Setup. In our experiments, we generate the adver-
sarial images following the same steps as [33] as discussed above
which are sufficient to evaluate our defence.
Attack Pairs: Both the source and target images are randomly
chosen from the test dataset, and they are not used for training
the Student model. This treatment matches the assumption that
the Student model is black-box, and the attacker cannot obtain the
training data. For the targeted attacks, we randomly choose 1K
source and target image pairs to generate adversarial images. For
the non-targeted attacks, we also generate 1K adversarial images
by randomly choosing source images and 5 target images with dif-
ferent classes for each of them. After that, we evaluate the distance
between the internal feature vectors of the adversarial and target
images. The source and target pair with the smallest internal repre-
sentation distance will be chosen to generate the final adversarial
images of the non-targeted attacks.
Attack Configuration: The adversarial images are generated to
target at different attack layers. The optimal attack layer with the
highest attack success rate will be considered as the final attack
layer [33]. The perturbation budget of the adversarial images is
0.003 in the DSSIM metric [34] for the Face Recognition task and
0.01 for the Traffic Sign Recognition task, which is considered as less
detectable thresholds [33]. We use Adadelta [35] as the optimizer
of the adversarial sample generator. The optimized problem of the
adversarial images generation uses 2000 for the iteration times and
1 for the learning rate.
Towards Defeating Misclassification Attacks Against Transfer Learning Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6
R
a
te
Number of differentiators
FPR (Targeted) FPR using threshold(Targeted)
FPR(Non-targeted) FPR using threshold(Non-targeted)
TPR TPR using threshold
(a) Face Recognition
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6
R
a
te
Number of differentiators
FPR (Targeted) FPR using threshold(Targeted)
FPR(Non-targeted) FPR using threshold(Non-targeted)
TPR TPR using threshold
(b) Traffic Sign Recognition
Figure 5: Performance of defence with different numbers of
differentiators in Face and Traffic Sign
4.2 Evaluation
We evaluate our design by comparing the robustness of the sys-
tems with and without our design. We also compare our design
with other defences to demonstrate the advantages. In particular,
we appraise both the effectiveness and efficiency of our design.
Regarding the effectiveness, we evaluate metrics, including our
defence rate against the attacks targeting at different layers. We
also demonstrate the defence rate in the perturbation budget of the
attacks and show that our design is effective for variance attack
configurations. Besides, we indicate the accuracy preservation of
our defence by showing the relationship between iteration number
and model accuracy for the clean inputs. In addition, we apply other
attacks to our design and show that our design methodology can
readily be deployed to address general attacks in machine learning
systems. Regarding efficiency, we evaluate the memory and time
cost of our design. Finally, we compare benign input accuracy, de-
fence performance, and efficiency of our design with prior defences
in [33].
4.2.1 Effectiveness. The effectiveness of our defence is evaluated
by both the defence rate and model accuracy. On the one hand,
our models should be able to reject the adversarial inputs. So we
evaluate our design by the false positive rate (FPR) of the attacker’s
inputs. It equals to the number of inputs detected and rejected as
negative divides the number of total adversarial inputs. High FPR
shows the robustness of our defence against adversaries. On the
other hand, the models are expected to classify the benign inputs
correctly. As a result, we also evaluate the accuracy of themodels for
the clean inputs by using the true positive rate (TPR). It is defined
as the number of inputs validated as positive benign inputs divides
the number of total testing clean inputs. High TPR means that
Targets FGSM [9] DF [20] CW [5]
Face Student 98.2% 99.8% 97.9%Ensemble 6.7% 2.0% 3.2%
Traffic Sign Student 90.0% 95.2% 98.1%Ensemble 4.3% 1.7% 4.2%
Table 1: Defending against General Attacks
Unguarded Models Models w. our design
# of Parameters 1.34 × 108(512.33MB) 1.35 × 108(513.58MB)
Pruning Tags 0(0MB) 1.20 × 108(14.25MB)
Total Size 512.33MB 527.83MB
Table 2: Memory Consuming of Models with VGG Structure
our defence has less hit on the original classification performance.
Firstly, we compare the performance for the Student models with
the defence and the original Student models without any defence.
The results confirm that models with our method reject most of the
adversarial inputs of the misclassification attacks.
Our defence reduces the FPRs from 100% and 97% for the Face
Recognition and Traffic Sign Recognition model to 6% and 1% for
the targeted attacks, and 8% and 7% for the non-targeted attacks.
The size of the ensemble models are set 5 for both two tasks with 83
and 43 classes. With a single CPU core, the Student model inference
costs 0.54s on average, and the total cost of the same preliminary
inference and ensemble latency is around 2.11s. Due to our small
ensemble models, the overhead introduced in the inference does not
appear to be the bottleneck in transfer learning systems. We also
evaluate our defence by applying attacks with different configura-
tions such as number of differentiators, attack layer, perturbation
budget, to show the scalability of our defence in details. It is shown
that our design is robust for variant of attacks.
Number of differentiators:We evaluate our defence by gradually
increase the number of differentiators in the second step. The results
show that small number of differentiators (5 in our experiments)
used in the second phase of our design can be sufficient to defend
against the attacks.
Figure 5 a shows the relationship among the FPR of both targeted
and non-targeted adversarial inputs, the TPR and the number of
differentiators in the step two inference for Face Recognition task.
For Deep-layer Feature Extractor, based on the experience of prior
work [33], the attack success rates to the original Student model
without our defence are more than 95% for both the targeted and
non-targeted attacks. After applying our design, about 90% for both
targeted and non-targeted attacks are detected and rejected with a
few accuracy loss after 5 differentiators inference. Figure 5b shows
the relationship for the Traffic Signs Recognition. It can be seen
that the FPR drops to less than 10% after 4 differentiators.
We also evaluate how our defence affects the classification of
the clean inputs. Figure 5 also shows the TPR. As Figure 5b shown,
the TPR is evidently reduced after combining more than 5 differ-
entiators. It is caused by the false negative when increasing the
number of models. As seen, the small-scale ensemble models can
also preserve the accuracy of our design.
Besides, we evaluate setting a threshold when validating or re-
jecting in the second phase inference. We introduce this threshold
value to reduce the contingency when judging inputs based on only
one negative result. The inputs are rejected only if the number of
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Figure 8: Iteration Number
negative results is greater than the threshold. Figure 5 compares
the FPRs and TPRs when setting threshold as 1(our baseline de-
sign) and increasing it to 2. For both tasks, the TPRs are slightly
improved for the larger threshold due to the drop of the False Neg-
ative. However, the FPRs that represent the attack effectiveness
increase dramatically. Therefore, more differentiators should be ap-
plied to compensate for these rising FPRs. To minimize the latency
and the number of inference differentiators, our implementation
keeps the threshold to be 1.
Attack Layer:We evaluate our defence by applying attacks aiming
at different layers. Since the attackers do not know which transfer
method is used for the development of the Student models, they
generate small sets of adversarial images targeting several layers to
find the optimal attack layer. Our design is expected to mitigate the
attacks aiming at all layers. For Deep-layer Feature Extractor, based
on the experience of prior work [33], the optimal attack layer is at
the last frozen layer. In Figure 6a, our defence is quite effective. For
the original Student model without our defence, the success rates
for the attack aiming at the last layer are almost 100% for both the
targeted and non-targeted attacks. After applying our design, the
FPR of the adversarial examples drops to about 4% for the targeted
attacks and 9% for the non-targeted attacks.
Figure 6b shows the relationship between the attack layers and
the FPR of the adversarial examples with and without the defence
for the Traffic Signs Recognition. It can be seen that the FPR of the
adversarial inputs targeting at different layers keeps small, where
most of them are less than 10% for the targeted attacks and 20% for
the non-targeted attacks. Unlike the unguarded models which have
an obvious increase of the FPR of the adversarial examples when
the attack layers close to the optimal layer, the variation tendency
for our design is flat. As seen, it is difficult for the attackers to find
the optimal layer with a small set of adversarial images. In addition,
even when the attackers successfully find the optimal attack layer,
the FPR of these adversarial examples is still limited below 20%.
Perturbation Budget: In practice, the attack configurations like
the perturbations added to the inputs can be various. A larger
perturbation budget makes the adversarial inputs stronger to fool
the classifiers. In order to justify our defense’s ability in different
situations, we evaluate our design for different perturbation budgets.
Figure 7 shows the relationships between perturbation budgets and
the FPR of the adversarial images for both Face and Traffic Sign
Recognition.
We choose the optimal attack layers which have the highest
attack success rates as shown in Figures 6. According to the results,
our design is robust to the perturbation. For the Face Recognition,
when the perturbation budgets are in the range of 0.0004 and 0.003,
the FPR of attacker’s inputs targeting unguarded models increases
to almost 1. And for a larger perturbation budget, the FPR increases
observably. For the Traffic Signs Recognition, the attack is effective
when the perturbation budget is larger than 0.01. On the contrary,
the models with our defence are more robust to the perturbation
variation. In the test region, the FPRs are less than 10%.
Extending to Other General Attacks:We also evaluate our de-
fence over some common attacks targeting at conventional machine
learning systems to demonstrate the generality of our design. We
apply FGSM, DeepFool and Carlini-Wagner attacks [5, 9, 20] to
the Teacher models known to the adversaries and evaluate their
adversarial examples by the targeted Student models. The results
show that they are less effective for transfer learning system where
most of their attack success rate drops from almost 100% to about
2%. As we introduced in section 6, these general attacks do lost
their effectiveness when the targeted models transfer to new tasks.
We further evaluate our design assuming the Student model is
known while our defence is unknown to the attackers. The experi-
ments show that they are also ineffective in this case. The attack
success rates of all three attacks drop from above 90% to less than
10% since most of the adversarial examples are rejected by our
defence. As a result, our design also provides robustness when
defending against general attacks.
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Face Traffic Sign
Accuracy Attack Success Rate Accuracy Attack Success RateTargeted Non-targeted Targeted Non-targeted
Original Unguarded Model 98.1% 92.5% 99.8% 96.5% 43.5% 95.2%
Randomizing Input via Dropout [33] 49.0% 4.8% 90.8% 90.5% 2.3% 40.9%
Injecting Neuron Distances [33] 95.1% 20.6% 79.0% 94.0% 8.4% 62.7%
Ensemble Differentiators 91.6% 6.1% 8.5% 92.9% 5.6% 8.1%
Table 3: Performance Comparison among Different Defences
Original Attacks Defence Unknown Defence Known Pruning Ratios Unknown
Targeted Attacks 92.5% 6.1% 26.2% 10.1%
Non-targeted Attacks 99.8% 8.5% 80.1% 40.0%
Table 4: Comparison for Different Adversarial Capability
Iteration Number: The models applying our design can still main-
tain the acceptable accuracy for the benign inputs after several
iteration periods. Some defence approaches may affect the perfor-
mance of classification. As introduced in Section 3, the original
neural networks are pruned in our design. Previous studies [11, 24]
show that pruning the neural network of classifiers will affect the
model accuracy, while iteratively pruning and retraining can help
the models regain their accuracy. In our design, the weights in the
frozen layers are fixed, and thus the damage caused by the pruning
cannot be recovered by retraining these layers. Our experiments
show that the iteration pruning and retraining for only the unfrozen
layers can still regain an acceptable model accuracy for the clean
inputs. In addition, the pruned models with more iteration numbers
for pruning and retraining will lead to higher model accuracy.
Figure 8 illustrates the connection between the iteration times
and the accuracy of the Student models for the benign inputs of
our two tasks. It can be found that the model accuracy for both
Face and Traffic Signs Recognition tasks increases to more than 90%
after 5 iterations. As a result, with iteration pruning and retraining,
the accuracy of the ensemble models rises back to an acceptable
value.
4.2.2 Memory Efficiency Evaluation. Here, we evaluate the mem-
ory consumption of our design. Table 2 shows the parameters for
the original model and our ensemble models. In our design, the
parameters consist of two parts. One is the original weights and
bias of the Teacher model, which are directly reused in the differen-
tiators. The memory consumption is the same as a Student model
developed by general transfer learning. Another part is the pruning
tags and the individual weights and bias of the last classification
layer for each differentiator. It can be found that most of the param-
eters of the models are reused. As seen, our design only consumes
extra 3% memory compared to the original.
4.2.3 Comparison with Others Defences. As introduced in Section 6,
two basic defence approaches against transfer learning are intro-
duced. They are Randomizing Input via Dropout and Injecting Neuron
Distances. We further compare our design with these two defences.
The experimental results can be shown as Table 3.
Comparison to Randomizing Input via Dropout: In Random-
izing Input via Dropout, several random pixels of the input images
are dropped to decrease the attack success rates of adversarial im-
ages. Although it makes the models more robust, the accuracy of
the Student models is severely affected. On the contrary, our design
maintains much better accuracy of the Student models. Table 3
reports the comparison between our defence and Randomizing
Input via Dropout method. For Randomizing Input via Dropout
method, the accuracy drops from 98% to 49% after the attacks being
conducted. Our design still maintains the classification accuracy
at about 92% by doing iteration pruning and retraining. Moreover,
the defence rates of both targeted attacks and non-targeted attacks
in our design are higher.
Comparison to Injecting Neuron Distances: Another defence
method is Injecting Neuron Distances. It retrained the whole Stu-
dent model to increase the distances of the internal feature vectors
at the cut-off layer for the inputs. The ability of Injecting Neu-
ron Distances defending against the non-targeted attacks is less
effective. In our design, multiple Differentiators are trained for de-
fending against multiple targeted attacks or non-targeted attacks.
Such treatment makes our models more robust to these attacks.
Detailed comparison is shown as Table 3. The attack success rate
for the non-targeted attacks for Injecting Neuron Distances is about
79% and 63% for two tasks; it is much higher than our design which
is 8.5% and 8.1%.
In addition, this method sometimes does not accommodate trans-
fer learning applications with small-scale datasets according to
our experiments. As introduced in Section 6, Injecting Neuron Dis-
tances retrains the whole models to increase the dissimilarities of
the internal features at the attack layers. However, this obstacle
of training will increase when the targeted Student model has less
training data. In contrast, our defence only fine-tunes a few layers,
which still facilitates the strength of transfer learning.
We also compare the time cost of both defence approaches. Our
experiments with 1 GPU gtx1070 take about 25 minutes to generate
a model with injected neuron distance, while about 36 minutes for
our design. Note that this cost is one-time, which is only incurred
during setup.
5 DISCUSSION
Classifying Adversarial Images: To fit broader range of appli-
cations which require deep analysis on the adversarial inputs, we
also provide a design correctly classifying the adversarial images
rather than just rejecting them. Based on our experiments, the dif-
ferentiators in our design can be highly robust to the adversarial
examples whose both source and target class are in their training
subset. Namely, a differentiator trained by a subset consisted of
class i and j can correctly classify the adversarial examples that
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are class i and target at j or the reverse. Since each differentiators
can classify the adversarial examples corresponding to a attack
pairs, the ensemble models for all of them can be used to classify
every possible attack pairs. K(k − 1)/2 differentiators should be
trained in this proposed design. However, this is also one-time cost
during setup. Our experiments achieve about 91% and 96% classifi-
cation rate for the Face and Traffic Sign Recognition tasks. Detailed
ensemble design can be found in Appendix B.
Attack Efficiency with Known Defence Methodology: Based
on the guidance principle discussed by Carlini et al. in [4], where
the defence algorithm might not be held secret, we enhance the
knowledge of the attackers on the defence strategy. The attackers
are assumed to know our defence strategies, including the activa-
tion pruning and the ensemble structure we developed. However,
the pruning ratios for each differentiator designed for the defence
are assumed unknown to the adversaries. It is reasonable and prac-
tical to assume that those ratios are secret parameters and not easily
inferred by querying from the attackers due to the ensemble struc-
tures of our design. As a result, it is difficult for the attackers to
build the same pruned models exactly as ours, which makes them
still hard to attack our design.
Table 4 shows the attack success rates when the attackers apply
the attacks on one distilled model but pruned via different ratios.
It can be found that the attacks are less effective even for a single
differentiator. We also strengthen the capabilities of the attackers by
assuming they can develop exactly the same pruned models as we
built. Namely, the attackers have full access to the Student models
and are able to apply the white-box attacks. The experimental
results are also shown in Table 4. Since our differentiators are
pruned and highly distilled, it is difficult for the attackers to generate
the adversarial examples in limited perturbation budgets. It is even
harder for the adversarial to generate adversarial examples for
randomly selected groups of differentiators. Therefore, our defence
still maintains the robustness of the system, assuming our defence
strategy is known.
6 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial AttacksAgainstMachine Learning Systems:One
of the common adversarial attacks is to build adversarial examples
to cause misclassification during inference. Adversarial examples
are (misclassified) inputs to machine learning models but slightly
different from the clean (correctly classified) inputs. Lots of prior
studies show that numbers of machine learning models are vulner-
able to these adversarial inputs [9, 20, 25, 29]. However, it is worthy
noting that the above general attacks are less effective in trans-
fer learning systems [33]. Recent studies about how to attack the
transfer learning system follow two different approaches. One tries
to demonstrate attacks by generating adversarial models during
their development periods [13]. Another approach is to generate
adversarial inputs for both targeted and non-targeted attacks [33].
In pracitce, it is easier for attackers in practice to use adversarial
inputs rather than generating adversarial models during system
development [8]. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on the latter one
proposed by Wang et al. [33] and aim to mitigate the most practical
misclassification attacks in current literature.
Defences Against Adversarial Machine Learning: Several ap-
proaches can increase the robustness of machine learning systems
against adversarial examples. The first is adversarial training, which
adds adversarial images to the training datasets during system de-
velopment [16, 31]. Others propose to preprocess the inputs before
they are sent to the classifiers by extra layers or networks [1, 3, 7].
Note that defences such as adversarial training and dropout affect
the model accuracy, which are not applicable to sensitive appli-
cations. Recently, Liu et al. develop a defence against backdoor
attacks via pruning [18]. However, since the structures and weights
of the Student Models are changed during development, their de-
fence cannot be directly used for the transfer learning attacks we
target [33].
We have not found effective yet efficient methods of defeating the
transfer learning misclassification attacks [33]. Wang et al. suggest
two basic approaches which either suffer from accuracy loss or
expensive cost. One is called Randomizing Input via Dropout which
applies dropout for the input layer of the Models while affecting
the model accuracy. Another is Injecting Neuron Distances, which
proposes to break the effectiveness of the attacks by increasing
the dissimilarities of the internal features at attack layers. The
parameters of the whole models are retrained, which requires large
computation costs, especially for large and deep neural networks,
and reduces the advantages of transfer learning. Besides, the non-
targeted attacks can still be effective to the above approaches, as
demonstrated in [33].
As a general defence philosophy, ensemble models have been
exploited in [2, 14, 19]. However, they can hardly address the at-
tacks in transfer learning scenarios. Bagnall’s defence [2] losses
accuracy in the sophisticated models which are the common targets
for transfer learning. Others [14, 19] retrain the entire network for
each ensemble models, which is not effective with limited data and
computation cost. Our design employs customized approaches in
the transfer learning system, which overcomes the limitations of the
above methods. A recent study [12] observes that assembling sev-
eral weak defences is not sufficient to develop a strong defence. We
note that their results are different from our scenarios and not ap-
plicable to our design. In our design, it is the distilled differentiator
which reduces the attack transferability. Each of our differentiators
is considerably effective against the corresponding attacks, and this
defence for the specific attacks between two classes is extended to
all possible attacks by using the ensemble structure. In other words,
we effectuate the strong defence of the differentiators rather than
combining weak defence by ensemble methods.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose and implement a practical defence against
the strong misclassification attacks in the transfer learning applica-
tions. We use network pruning to develop distilled differentiators
that reduce the transferability of the attacks and improve their ro-
bustness against the adversarial examples. Activation pruning and
flexible pruning ratio selection are applied to preserve accuracy. In
addition, we introduce ensemble methods to further improve the ro-
bustness of our design based on a two-phase inference constructing
by the Student model and a small-scale of two-class differentiators.
We demonstrate that the ensemble models can effectively defend
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against both the targeted and non-targeted attacks by rejectingmost
of the adversarial examples. We also show that our design preserves
the scalability, effectiveness and comparable clean input accuracy
with small size of ensemble models. Besides, we further evaluate
our defence compared to other defence approaches. Our design is
shown to be more effective and accessible to be implemented.
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A MISCLASSIFICATION ATTACKS IN
TRANSFER LEARNING
For realization, the misclassification attacks in transfer learning are
minimizing the distance for the internal outputs within perturbation
budgets. To measure this perturbation, one simple way is to use
Lp distance which is a common measurement for vectors. In our
design, it is used to measure the internal feature similarity. For
the distance of inputs, Structural Dissimilarity (DSSIM) is used in
our design. DSSIM is a distance matrix evaluating the structural
similarity of images [34]. It evaluates the difference between two
input images similar to human’s criterion which is suitable for
image recognition.
As we have introduced, the misclassification attacks can be trans-
lated to an optimized problem as equation 1.
minD(HK (x ′s ),HK (xt ))
s .t . d(x ′s ,xs ) < P
(1)
The distance (measured by D(.)) between both internal feature H (.)
at attack layer K , for the adversarial input x ′s and the target inputs
xt is minimized. The perturbations adding to source inputs xs is
limited by the budget P (measured by distance function d(.)).
The misclassification attacks can be both targeted and non-
targeted. A targeted attack is applied by choosing a mimicked input
with a targeted label class. A non-targeted attack is applied by eval-
uating multiple adversarial images for different targeted attacks and
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Algorithm 3 Voting Strategy
Input:
x , input image;
S1, S2, ... SM , K (K−1)2 Differentiators classifying between
every two classes in a K classes classification problem, the
outputs of these Differentiators are labels from 1 to
K.
Output:
y, final prediction.
1: function voting(x , S1, S2, . . . SM )
2: for i = 1 to K do
3: vi (x) ← ∑Km=1 I(i = Sm (x))
4: k ← argmin
k
vk (x)
5: if vk (x) = K − 1 then
6: y ← k
7: else
8: y ← 0 ▷ we define class 0 as rejection.
9: return y
choosing the one with the smallest internal feature dissimilarity.
For the non-targeted attacks which evaluate multiple adversar-
ial images for different targeted attacks and choose the one with
the smallest internal feature dissimilarity, it can be solved via an
optimized problem as equation 2
minmini ∈I {D(HK (x ′s ),HK (xt i))}
s .t . d(x ′s ,xs ) < P
(2)
According to [33], a subset including five supposed targeted
attack images is sufficient to find adversarial images with high
attack success rates.
In both attacks, since the attackers do not know the transfer
learning approaches or the cut-off layers for building the Student
models. The attackers will attack each layer of the Student models
to find the optimal layers and generate the final adversarial images.
B DESIGN FOR CLASSIFYING THE
ADVERSARIAL IMAGES
We further improve our defence approach to correctly classify the
adversarial images. As we discussed, we follow the same approach
to build distilled differentiators via network pruning but different
ensemble construction.
Considering a classification problem with K classes, there are
K (K−1)
2 possible label pairs (ci , c j ), where each of them corresponds
to a differentiator. Each of them is trained using their correspond-
ing training subsets. They are expected to be fully pruned and
robust to the adversarial inputs according to the design goals of
the differentiators. For any clean inputs, there will always be K − 1
differentiators which can correctly classify the inputs. Since they
are highly robust to the adversarial images, the correct prediction
for the inputs can be produced by the voting of the differentiators.
The detailed strategy is described in Algorithm 3.
The inputs will be identified by all differentiators to get the final
predictions where all these predictions will be counted. Based on
our structure, the maximum number of differentiators voting to the
same class is K − 1. If K − 1 differentiators have the same prediction,
it is considered as the final outcome. If the maximum number of
the differentiators voting to the same class is less than K − 1, it is
considered that some of the differentiators are fooled. As seen, the
inputs will be considered as an adversarial input and rejected for
this case.
Efficiency Improvement: The scalability of our design is also
considered. For a complex transfer learning classification task with
large numbers of labels, it is expensive to build many such differ-
entiators for each label pair. So, it is necessary to include multiple
classes in a differentiator to improve the efficiency of our design.
As we mentioned above, building differentiator for each label pair
can make the defence more effective. If more classes are considered
during activation pruning, the difference among the distilled dif-
ferentiators will decrease, which may affect the successful defence
rates. In order to maintain both differences among the differentia-
tors, we would like the activation of the classes in one differentiator
to be similar. Similar activation will lead to a larger common acti-
vated component which can increase the ratios of the unnecessary
components of this differentiator. So it can have larger pruning rate
budgets and larger difference to the original and other models.
In order to develop the multiple label differentiator, the clusters
are built among all the labels based on their activation. The labels
in one cluster are regarded as similar labels and combined in one
differentiator. And it can reduce the total number of differentiators
and make our design more scalable.
Notice that the number of labels combined in one differentiator
is limited. For a differentiator with more labels, the components
activated by these labels also increases, which decreases the prun-
ing rate for accurate models. Less pruning rate makes them less
difference from the original Student model, and the transferability
of the attacks maintains.
Multiple Label Pair Differentiator: In order to reduce the devel-
opment cost, one initial approach is to combine several differen-
tiators as a multiple label pair differentiator It targets at defending
the adversarial images built from more than two classes. Table 5
reports the performance of these differentiators in Face Recognition.
As seen, combination of the differentiators somehow reduces the
defence performance in our current experiments.
The attack success rate for the targeted attacks increases to 13%
while for the non-targeted attacks to 45%. Since the number of
labels increases, more neurons are active during the classification.
To maintain the accuracy, fewer neurons are pruned during the
development of our defence. This restraint on adversarial images is
relieved. As a result, the defence ability of the designmay be affected
when multiple differentiators are combined to one. Nevertheless,
as discussed above, the differentiators consisting of labels chosen
by cluster have better performance than randomly labels chosen.
Table 5 compares the performance between both approaches. It
can be found that, properly choosing the classes can increase the
defence rate especially for the non-targeted attacks.
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Accuracy Attack Success RateTargeted Attacks Non-targeted Attacks
Original Unguarded Model 98.1% 92.5% 99.8%
Differentiator of Two Classes 98.9% 9.0% 13.0%
Differentiator of Three Randomly Chosen Classes 95.0% 13.5% 45.0%
Differentiator of Three Clustered Classes 95.0% 11.8% 21.5%
Table 5: Performance of Multiple-class Differentiator
